Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government
| Author | : | |
| Rating | : | 4.75 (547 Votes) |
| Asin | : | B07314CDVK |
| Format Type | : | |
| Number of Pages | : | 387 Pages |
| Publish Date | : | 2014-02-03 |
| Language | : | English |
DESCRIPTION:
A notable contribution to the literature in comparative politics and public policy on good governance, and to corruption studies more widely.. Countries where merit-recruited employees occupy public bureaucracies perform better than those where public employees owe their post to political connections. The book provides a coherent theory of why, and ample evidence showing that meritocratic bureaucracies are conducive to lower levels of corruption, higher government effectiveness, and more flexibility to adopt modernizing reforms. Data comes from both a novel dataset on the bureaucratic structures of over 100 countries as well as from narratives of particular countries, with a special focus on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in Spain and Sweden. Why are some countries less corrupt and better governed than others? Challenging conventional explanations on the remarkable differences in quality of government worldwide, this book argues that the organization of bureaucracy is an often overlooked but critical factor
His research deals with comparative politics and public administration, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. Carl Dahlström is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Göteborgs Universitet, Sweden, and Research Fellow at the Quality of Government Institute. . His research is concerned w
Advance praise: 'In this impressive book, Dahlstrom and Lapuente think deeply about the organization of the state and the quality of government. In this era of increasing anti-government populism, they provide hope that at least democracies will be able to continue to perform at high levels and according to the best scientific evidence available.' Margaret Levi, Stanford University, California . Theirs is a significant contribution to understanding the variation in the performance of democratic governments. They argue that a productive structuring of the relationship between politicians and civil servants minimizes corruption and inefficiency. It is a terrific example of research that carefully builds bridges across literatures to provide new insights on big questions.' David E. They provide co